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i
n Chinese, the word ‘crisis’ is expressed by the combination of two signs: 
danger (wei) and opportunity (ji). in accordance with this definition, the 
current food crisis that many observers have identified as ongoing since 
2008, comprises ‘danger’, specifically the suffering, both acknowledged 
and silent, of vulnerable populations affected by rising prices; alongside 
‘opportunity’, which in this case is the chance for numerous stakeholders to 
voice their opinions regarding the handling of the crisis and to claim rights 
or defend legitimate positions in the institutional game. there have been 
countless summits (at high and low levels), seminars and roundtables on 
the topic of food security; and a multitude of tv and radio programmes on 
the subject. Since 2008, in france alone there have been no fewer than ten books 
published on the topic of feeding the world, humankind or humanity1. 
in many ways, the issues at stake since 2008 with regard to food security are not 
completely new. indeed, to many observers the crisis is purely the manifestation of 
the end of a cycle of agricultural disinvestment, as occurred in the 1950s and the 
1970s (hlpe, 2011). it is therefore unsurprising to see that history has repeated 
itself. the only difference is that the world has changed in the meantime, so that 
the current crisis engages a much broader range of stakeholders.
this new scene of discussions and actions provides the focus for this article. firstly 
we examine the way in which the current price crisis is not related to a reduction in 
supply, and that the food crisis appears to be above all a crisis of poverty. We then 
1. Books by Barnier, Brunel, Charvet, Dorin et al., Ghersi, Gleizes et al., Griffon, parmentier, fumey, petit, rastoin, 
thinard, Worldwach institute, Guillou and matheron.
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the food crisis is above all a crisis of poverty, not a crisis of global agri-
cultural production. Some of the traditional actors in the agricultural 
sector raise malthusian fears in an attempt to obtain a new legitimacy in 
a changing environment of food security governance, where new actors 
are entering onto the stage.
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look at how new stakeholders, both international and local, have emerged into the 
field of food security. the article concludes by highlighting the growing importance 
of non-state stakeholders, civil society, nGos, the media and the private sector in 
areas of governance for food security. 
Food security And AgriculturAl production
there is a paradox between the way in which the understanding of food security 
has evolved over 30 years to encompass the recognition of its multi-factorial and 
multi-sectoral nature, and how it is now often reduced to the single dimension of 
food availability.
the definition of food security following the 1976 World food Conference focused 
on food availability and the risk of failing to meet increased demand. this rising 
demand was primarily seen as a demographic question, at a time when the stabiliza-
tion of world population growth seemed a distant or even hypothetical prospect. this 
definition arose in a particular context, similar in some respects to that which has 
existed since 2008: climatic aberrations affected food production while oil and grain 
prices soared on the international markets. With thoughts dominated by malthusian 
population growth curves and price spikes, the two major responses to emerge were 
to increase agricultural production and market regulation, through the storage of 
surplus supplies. forty years on, demand is still accelerating, especially given the 
new prospects for biomass energy, and we are once again amid climatic aberra-
tions and soaring prices; it is not therefore surprising that yesterday’s solutions are 
making a reappearance today.
as in similar moments in history, future food supply scenarios have been envis-
aged to draw attention to the importance of the agricultural sector. indeed, one of 
the advantages of such instruments is to highlight, as malthus did, the rapidly rising 
demand for food relative to agricultural supply. the conclusions are therefore always 
the same: all necessary efforts must be made to increase supply through investment 
in agricultural research and infrastructure, such as irrigation for example.
historically, this equation has been solved partly through the acceleration of the 
growth in supply, particularly by the Green revolution, and partly through the 
moderation of demand through population control. Significant dietary changes 
were considered to accompany population growth, economic development and 
urbanization. today, the majority of recent works remain convinced of the need to 
accelerate the growth in supply. only a few directly address the question of diet, 
particularly the consumption trends for animal products and envisage ‘unfashion-
able’ demand-reduction scenarios (paillard et al., 2010; foresight. the future of 
food and farming, 2011). 
however, the definition of food security has changed dramatically, especially with 
the decisive contributions of amartya Sen who put forward the concept of access: 
the objective is not to produce more, the priority must be to give each individual the 
ability to access the means to produce and/or to consume. from a purely agricultural 
issue, today’s perspective has shifted the focus so that the question is now one of 
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capabilities, purchasing power and thus poverty. the 
definition adopted at the 1996 World food Summit, 
and which continues to hold sway today, reflects this 
emphasis on access and not just availability. and it is 
this shift that explains the emergence of institutions 
onto the stage, such as the World Bank, that are no 
longer solely dedicated to agricultural production but 
are more broadly concerned with economic develop-
ment.
however, due to the price crisis and the conclusions 
of the projective scenarios that look ahead to 2050, 
there has been a return to a reduced vision of food 
security as a balance between supply and demand. 
the spectre of malthus is apparent in the media and 
political rhetoric, despite the fact that all the data show there is currently no global 
agricultural production crisis. Worldwide agricultural production continues to accel-
erate – in fact it has never been stronger – and the growth in food availability per 
capita has not slowed in recent years. 
Sub-Saharan africa, for example, which is considered food insecure at the regional 
level, has seen an increase in the consumption of cereals even during the recent crisis 
years, due to increased production.
if there is a food crisis then it exists because international oil, cereal and food oil 
prices have increased rapidly, which has had an impact on impoverished popula-
tions, particularly those that have accumulated in cities. and if these prices have 
risen, it is not so much because of a lack of production, but rather due to an increased 
demand, especially for non-food (and non-feed) uses and in particular the produc-
tion of agro-fuels (figure 1). 
in an increasingly tense market with reduced global stocks, climatic aberrations 
have resulted in higher prices. meanwhile, speculation on the derivative markets of 
agricultural raw materials has exacerbated the situation, along with the imposition 
of export restrictions in some countries. over time, these conditions have combined 
to change a price increase into a price explosion.
in this context it is clear that the stakeholders of the crisis are not only farmers; 
in reality a much broader range of agents is involved.
diversiFied stAkeholders
the first stakeholders to be directly affected by price increases are international 
market operators, traders, brokers, financial analysts, banks, etc. Some of these 
agents are linked to the agricultural sector, through the use of futures markets to 
hedge against risks related to prices. But these agents derive more from the world of 
trade than from that of finance, evolving in a sphere that is relatively autonomous 
from the agricultural sector, of which they have little knowledge. their tools are 
complex and poorly understood in the food industry, which considers financialization 
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as an obscuration of market functioning. this partially explains the complexity of 
the debate on the controversial role of speculation in these markets; information 
is difficult to obtain and relationships with professionals have become uncommon.
Biofuel producers now join the ranks of buyers of agricultural commodities, 
contributing to the ratcheting up of market tension. not only has their demand 
become significant and contributes directly to raising oil and maize prices, and 
also in consequence to increasing the prices of the other substitutable cereals, but 
they also buy or rent agricultural land for energy crops. these stakeholders also 
strengthen the connections between the agricultural and energy commodity markets, 
since their competitiveness depends on oil prices. this interconnection, which is a 
factor of instability in agricultural markets, is a new phenomenon that broadens the 
circle of stakeholders involved in food security to include energy sector stakeholders.
national states, which are also directly concerned with food prices, continue to 
play a role in regulating flows and prices in the interfaces with the international 
market. During the 2008 crisis, they fulfilled an important function in mitigating the 
price spikes for their domestic consumers. many governments have thus decided to 
reduce taxes on food imports, although this approach is not in accordance with Wto 
agreements that prohibit the use of variable taxes. the countries that have adopted 
this tactic have incurred a major financial cost: in 2008 tax losses for the eight 
countries of the West african economic and monetary Union (WaemU) amounted to 
between 480 and 880 million euros (Soulé et al, 2008). in parallel, many countries 
have also banned or restricted the export of food, fearing the loss of too much of their 
own produce onto the international market and the consequent risk of sudden price 
rises on their domestic markets. these measures, when widely applied to countries 
that export a significant amount of their agricultural produce, have made supplies 
scarce and pushed up international prices.
through either tax cuts or export restrictions, what is clear is that states are 
asserting their sovereignty to manage the crisis, even if the measures that they imple-
ment appear contradictory with those developed at the international level and are 
subject to criticism from the international community. although, as discussed later, 
a more global scale of governance has emerged from the crisis, the role of states, 
that a quarter of a century of liberalization had challenged, is making a comeback 
to the centre stage and resuming an important role.
States are not the main protagonists in the regulation of domestic markets in devel-
oping countries, particularly africa, a fact that was true for the 1970s price crisis 
and even more so today. private operators, traders and processors have for a long 
time been accused of existing only to make a profit on the backs of consumers and 
small producers, but have finally been recognized for their ability to supply rapidly 
growing consumer markets. 
locAl stAkeholders in the Agri-Food sector
africa provides an interesting case study, as a continent that continues to attract 
attention due to the important share of its population that is still considered to be 
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food insecure. indeed its recent development has gone against some preconceived 
ideas. thus, contrary to popular belief, food in africa remains largely dominated by 
local products. although often described as highly dependent on cereal imports, on 
the basis of fao data it can be calculated that wheat and rice imports for the entire 
continent only provide 12.2% of the available calories. While imports represent 
61.7% of the available wheat food supply on the continent, the proportion is much 
lower for rice (39.5%)2. Such figures put into perspective the dominant, if not exclu-
sive, position occupied by cereals in the food security debate. the average calorie 
intake for the whole african continent shows a great diversity (figure 2). Compared 
to world data (figure 3), africa derives a much lower proportion of its calorie intake 
from calories of animal origin (8% compared to 19% for the global average). 
Starch crops (cereals, roots, tubers and plantains) represent 70% of the available 
calories in africa, while they only account for 52% in the world data, with product 
distributions that vary from one country to another: some are dominated by cereals, 
some by roots and tubers (cassava, yam, sweet potato, etc.). as a proportion of 
calorific intake, these roots and tubers are thus three times higher in africa than in 
the world as a whole.
the situation is certainly different in cities, where imported products such as 
asian rice and european or american wheat have gained significant market shares. 
however, the share of these products throughout the urban food market is limited, 
except in special cases such as Dakar, which is frequently cited as an example despite 
its unrepresentativeness of the continent as a whole. Surveys conducted in 2008 
2. faoStat data for the average calorie intake in africa 1997-2007
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on urban household expenditure in the capitals of 
the WaemU countries (abidjan, Bamako, Bissau, 
Cotonou, Dakar, lome, niamey and ouagadougou) 
shattered the myth that these cities were being fed 
on imports (figure 3). 
in economic terms, imported cereals amounted to 
22% of the food market, compared to 14% for rice, 
maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, yams and plantains 
and other local starchy products. But these commodi-
ties that support the calorific intake of the poor, only 
constitute just over a third (36%) of the food market 
of the eight cities. animal products, meat, fish and 
dairy products account for just under a third (28%), 
and other products including oils, fruits, vegetables, sugar, condiments and bever-
ages, have a market equivalent to that of starch (36%).
these cities have thus become a real outlet for local agricultural production, the 
market value of which now exceeds all agricultural export markets. many foods 
formerly regarded as “subsistence” and designated for auto-consumption are now 
grown as cash crops. in addition, an intermediary sector has developed, involving 
collection, packaging, transportation, processing and distribution, which is providing 
cities with much more varied produce. trends in urban food demand are increas-
ingly moving towards products (such as flour, semolina, granules, fermented pastes, 
dried cassava chips, oil, etc.) that require more packaging, production, transpor-
tation and trade, thus providing employment for millions of people. in the eight 
capital cities of the WaemU countries, the urban restaurant sector alone accounts 
for 24% of the food market, i.e. one billion euros per year. Businesses in this sector, 
both upstream and downstream in the supply chain, are poorly recognized by public 
authorities due to the diffuse and “informal” nature of the sector, and because it 
largely involves women and is often considered as a sign of underdevelopment. 
abandoned by vocational training policies, excluded from bank credit systems and 
from the development of sanitary regulations and often persecuted by municipal 
authorities, the industry nevertheless feeds the vast majority of the population with 
low-cost foods that correspond to the population’s eating habits. far from simply 
reproducing rural culinary traditions, the sector is constantly innovating and contrib-
uting towards the invention of modern urban foods, while borrowing very little 
from Western models. indeed, the sector is becoming one of major job creation, 
particularly for vulnerable populations, and has a strategic link with food security 
(Broutin & Brice, 2006) (World Bank, 2007). over the past half-century, african 
cities have experienced population growth at a particularly rapid pace: in 1950 there 
were 33 million people, today this number stands at 420 million. however, despite 
this extraordinary growth rate, these cities have never experienced a food supply 
failure, except as a consequence of war, due to the expansion and organization of 
this intermediary food sector.
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it is clear that in the larger cities this sector is changing. the emergence of a 
middle class is beginning to lead to the generation of a new type of business model, 
often more formal and mechanized, that offers products with higher added value, 
a higher level of quality control and with packaging that enables such products to 
compete in self-service shops alongside standard industrial foods. it is new entre-
preneurs that are behind these businesses, often women, who sell not only on 
urban markets but also export to markets that cater to the diaspora throughout 
europe and north america. traders, who are gaining recognition as economic 
stakeholders, organize themselves to benefit 
from warehouse receipts and bank loans. in east 
africa, they have established financial exchanges 
where futures contracts are traded. the largest 
traders have now reached a stage where they 
can negotiate with public authorities. their role 
during the crisis is, however, controversial. Such 
agents have probably contributed to the mitiga-
tion of price rises by reducing their margins. however, a widely held belief persists 
that these traders have maintained their higher charges even after the price spikes 
began to return to lower levels.
these developments, especially the growing awareness of the demographic impor-
tance of urban markets on a continent with strong economic growth, are drawing 
the attention of foreign investors. as has been the case in latin america and asia for 
some time, africa is a continent where multinational agri-food companies are now 
actively prospecting. Such companies are attracted to countries with a developing 
middle class and they invest in industrial processing and supermarket distribution 
sectors. indeed, supermarkets are multiplying across africa, more so in eastern 
and Southern africa, and a little more gradually in Western and Central africa. 
europe, which has long dominated in these investment types, now has to compete 
with China, india, Brazil and South africa.
Consumers, the final agents in the food chain, have for the first time strongly 
registered their protest. population growth, which is still rapid in countries where 
demographic transition is incomplete, and urbanization, which is also rapid, mean 
that about 20,000 to 30,000 young people arrive on the labour market each year, 
per million inhabitants. this pace will continue for the next 20 years (Beaujeu 
et al., 2011). employment has lagged a long way behind this pace of population 
growth and millions of young people (63% of the african population is under 25) 
have entered into crowded cities which, despite the difficulties, continue to appear 
as places with greater opportunities than rural areas. only countries that have 
invested heavily in rural infrastructure such as transportation, communication, 
health, education, access to water, etc. have been able to reduce migration into cities.
in 2008, 2010 and 2011, riots occurred, that were dubbed by the media as “hunger 
riots”, in response to the high costs of living. the rioters were members of a desperate 
urban population that felt it lacked any future, which had exhausted its resistance 
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capacity after enduring successive years of crises, and who were exasperated by 
the political regimes in place, accusing them of not doing enough to create employ-
ment and to guarantee a more equitable distribution of resources. in most cases, 
the riots took place in cities with high levels of social tension; first oil prices began 
to rise, followed by a few notable foods, which together provided the spark to light 
the tinderbox.
the media have also played a role in the simultaneous nature of the riots and the 
creation of what was then called the “food crisis”. the diffusion of television and 
the internet has indeed drawn every citizen closer to one another, and instantly 
Box 1 diverGent interpretations and accounts oF the impacts oF price crises
Curiously, beyond the so-called 
“hunger” riots, we actually know 
very little about the transmission 
of higher international prices on 
domestic markets and their effects on 
household behaviour. there are few 
examples where statistical systems 
actually track consumers. Systems 
to prevent food crises are predom-
inantly rural and monitor precip-
itation, pest damage and produc-
tion volumes and prices. the fao 
also calculates the number of food 
insecure people in the world, based 
on an estimate of food availability, 
which roughly takes into account 
the income and purchasing power 
of rural and urban populations. 
through this method, since 2008 
the fao has been able to declare a 
sharp increase in the number of food 
insecure people, and announced the 
symbolic crossing of the one billion 
threshold for the number of people 
classified as “hungry”, with the 
intention of influencing decision-
makers in order to obtain a mandate 
to manage the crisis. however, the 
choice of indicator is not neutral: by 
basing the calculation on food avail-
ability, crisis resolution is viewed in 
terms of moving towards the promo-
tion of production, such as the 
greater distribution of fertilizers and 
seeds and incentives for new agri-
cultural investment, all in the name 
of the challenge to feed nine billion 
people by 2050. Curiously, the 2008 
high-level summit organized by the 
fao in rome did not even mention 
poverty and called only for a boost 
to agricultural production (Bricas & 
Daviron, 2008).
in response to the simplification of 
food insecurity to a problem of avail-
ability, other approaches have devel-
oped. these new approaches do not 
seek to objectively measure this inse-
curity, but in line with the proposals 
of S. maxwell, they are based on how 
this insecurity is felt by the popula-
tion. the calculation is no longer 
based on production statistics, indi-
cators of income distribution or 
price data, but on extensive popula-
tion surveys. another new aspect to 
these methods is the use of data that 
is no longer public but private: on the 
local level, nGos and development 
or humanitarian projects produce 
their own data that is usually inde-
pendent of national statistical tools, 
for which they have no use (Dury et 
al, 2011). on a national level, some 
nGos cover such a large geographic 
area that their data are considered as 
reference data, and are used by the 
fao. internationally, some studies 
have emerged that were carried out 
in several countries either by private 
polling institutes or by nGos. for 
example, since 2007 a Gallup poll 
has been conducted in over 100 
countries. on the basis of a large 
sample number, these surveys have 
concluded that in terms of the expe-
rience of food insecurity, the situa-
tion is improving at the global scale 
(headey, 2011). Due to rapidly rising 
incomes in major emerging countries 
and because of rising agricultural 
commodities prices for producers, 
the number of people lacking money 
to buy food has decreased signifi-
cantly. oxfam conducted a survey in 
dozens of countries involving more 
than 16,000 people, which showed 
that the price rise may have changed 
eating habits (oxfam, 2011). While 
all these data must, just like those 
of fao, be used with caution, they 
reveal the dual vision of food secu-
rity, which is either seen in terms of 
availability or poverty. in particular, 
they also reveal a game where the 
players vie for the choice of indicator 
to be used in arguments, since it is 
critical to steering the direction of the 
debate. Beyond technical and meth-
odological issues regarding indica-
tors, issues that are largely debated 
in national, regional or international 
forums involve a power struggle 
between agents that want the respon-
sibility of managing the crisis.  
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kept them informed of world events. the fall of the haitian government in april 
2008, against a backdrop of rising prices was instantly known throughout africa 
and generated protests that targeted the same objective. these riots related to the 
high cost of living are not new. the world has seen this before, often as localized 
events that were then considered as primarily internal phenomena. What is new 
is the simultaneity of the riots, about thirty occurred within a few weeks in africa, 
asia and america. and it is because this looks like an epidemic that concerns have 
been raised in international forums, including the United nations, in case there is 
a risk of global destabilization.
A multitude oF innovAtive initiAtives
it is this fear of destabilization that the international community has mobilized itself 
to address. Successive summits involving heads of state or governments have thus 
been organized in an attempt to alleviate the crisis. While the authorities in charge 
of food security had become less visible and were lacking the necessary authority to 
place this issue high on the agenda, the 2008 crisis has had the effect of reshuffling 
the stakeholder pack and providing an opportunity to reform these institutions. two 
simultaneous and apparently contradictory movements can be read in the multipli-
cation of institutional initiatives.
the first, as mentioned earlier, is a reaffirmation of the sovereign power of states 
to manage the crisis. this takes the form of trade policies (reducing import taxes and 
blocking exports) and, for some countries 
with poor agricultural resources, also 
entails large-scale land acquisitions in other 
countries to secure domestic supplies. the 
price surge caused a crisis of confidence in 
international markets as a means of securing 
stocks. in fact, some countries encountered difficulties when trying to buy wheat or 
rice on the international market and are consequently trying to diversify their supply 
modes, for example by boosting domestic production or by investing in production 
in other countries in addition to market purchases. the Doha round was interrupted 
at the end of 2008 by the stance taken by some countries that refused to make any 
trade compromises to ensure food security for their populations. in 2011, the break-
down of Wto talks means that the prospect of an international agreement is very 
uncertain in the short term.
While these agreements and international institutions are weakening, there is a 
parallel emergence of new global institutions and a reformation of old ones, such 
as: the high level task force (hltf), the reform of the Committee on World food 
Security, the Scaling Up nutrition (SUn) movement, etc. one feature of the evolution 
of these institutions is the emergence of non-state stakeholders: nGos and multina-
tional private corporations. the limitations of public funding that the financial crisis 
has exposed means that hopes are now resting on private funding. the SUn, which 
works in the field of nutrition, has a substantial budget at its disposal for financing 
what is new is the simultaneity 
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actions. the Gates foundation is also very active in this area, and so are companies 
that provide food supplements.
conclusion: whAt cAn we leArn From this 
emergence oF new stAkeholders?
Since 2008, the traditional agents in the agricultural sector (trade unions, ministries, 
the fao, agro-supply companies) have used the food crisis as a means to re-establish 
themselves with a new legitimacy, once again by citing malthusian scenarios. this 
approach still has the ability to re-mobilize, as it puts the spotlight onto the future 
supply and demand equation. a semantic shift betrays such approaches: these stake-
holders do not talk about individual food security, but about feeding the world or the 
supply/demand balance at the world level. agricultural production clearly has an 
important role to play, especially in areas where it is barely sufficient to cover food 
and monetary needs. But the recognition of the multi-sectoral nature of food security 
calls for a reconsideration of the role of agriculture by expanding its mandate well 
beyond that of providing sufficient biomass. it plays a role in job creation, in health 
and nutrition, in the stability of prices and incomes, and in culture, and it must 
therefore be evaluated on these functions. But 
since these functions are important, all the other 
sectors contributing to them are important too.
the food crisis has provided a window of oppor-
tunity for the reconstruction of governance that 
is based on more than a simple reflection of the 
increasing importance of the global level, but 
instead on a dual movement where states are 
regaining a level of influence that liberalization 
policies had tended to strip away from them. the interplay between stakeholders is 
therefore more complex, especially as new agents have gained considerable impor-
tance: firstly private companies, ranging from upstream agricultural ones – seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides – to agri-food processers and supermarkets; and secondly 
nGos. But the significance of these non-state agents is not limited to agricultural 
supply. it also extends to information systems – such as those that focus on the 
experience of food insecurity, on prices or on satellite imagery – including global 
ones, with consequences that are still poorly understood.
Ultimately, it is the people themselves, which we will not term as ‘consumers’ 
here, that are notably absent from food security governance, a large part of whom 
auto-consume their own production. apart from 2008 when these populations made 
themselves heard through rioting, the people remain the great silent majority in this 
debate. they are only approached through surveys, the methodologies of which 
influence the results. Whether one measures the degree to which objective needs 
are satisfied, people’s purchasing power or their opinions, the same reflection of 
expectations is not obtained. populations are also studied through representa-
tives: the state or local authorities, consumer associations or even supermarkets, 
since 2008, the traditional 
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which claim to speak on behalf of their clients. the legitimacy of these institutions 
is obviously debatable. But what is striking in all cases is the fact that the focus falls 
only on vulnerable or poor people. of course, the situation for these individuals is 
critical and has weakened since the price increase, if we believe the institutions 
with responsibility for the safety nets. the attention directed to these people is of 
course unquestionable: they are the ones who suffer. it is the health and future of 
their children that are put at risk. While attention must be given to the most vulner-
able, because they are often silent, more generally, the poorest populations must 
also not be forgotten. the deterioration in their purchasing power and resilience 
can tilt them towards volatile situations. it is also worth noting that no attention is 
given to those that have gained from the food crisis; and there are some of course! 
high prices, the development of agro-fuels, large-scale land acquisition and invest-
ments in the agro-food sector are all features of crises that allow some to benefit 
and make a profit. more generally, over-consumption in rich countries, where the 
demand appears infinite in a world of scarce fossil resources, is certainly a part of 
the problem and attention should be directed onto this matter. n
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